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analyze what they contribute or omit, with special emphasis on the DoD Directive, and make recommendations on how to improve U.S. national policy on stability operations.
Before we begin, it is necessary to answer a fundamental question: What are "Stability
Operations" and how do they relate to "Peacekeeping" and "Peace Operations"? Over the past several years, many terms have been used to describe actions which use military forces but do not quite fit the definition of major combat; recently however, there has been a general consensus on the use of these terms. While their definitions come from an Army Field Manual, the terms "Stability Operations" and "Support Operations" have become the terms commonly used by both the joint and inter-agency community to refer to military actions short of major combat. 2 In current usage, Stability Operations includes all forms of Peace Operations and
Peacekeeping and can also include actions as diverse as security assistance, non-combatant evacuation and combating terrorism. Support Operations are those actions taken to provide assistance to either foreign or domestic civil authorities, normally in response to a crisis or to deliver humanitarian aid. This understanding of the two terms is essential as we examine U.S.
policy in this arena.
Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD 25)
President Clinton issued PDD 25 in 1994, but it was kept secret until early 1996 when an unclassified version was released. This document described the administration's policy regarding peace operations and addressed several other important issues. Most important among these issues was which operations would receive U.S. support or participation, and how the United Nations should reform how they conducted business.
While both of these areas are important aspects of U.S. policy, our focus is on the very first issue addressed, making choices about which peace operations would receive U.S.
backing. This section of the policy addresses various standards that the administration will use to determine when the U.S. will support a proposed operation in the U.N. 3 In addition to these standards the policy strongly stresses that these operations must not be open-ended commitments with undefined schedules or budgets, and states that any operation that cannot be defined in these terms must not be undertaken. This section also specifies that the U.S. will use this same set of standards to evaluate ongoing missions as they come up for renewal of their U.N. mandate. PDD 25 goes on to spell out additional, and even more stringent, standards that will be used to evaluate any proposed peace operation in which U.S. troops will participate. 4 Of course, as with any set of evaluation criteria, it is very important how you define such terms as "unacceptable" or "significant". In this case an argument has been made that the administration could use this policy "to justify any decision with the terms of the Directive, on a ability to effectively conduct stability operations and interact with other agencies engaged in the same mission. We will examine the most significant of those actions and help explain what they really mean and why they are important.
The directive begins with this strong declaration regarding the intent of the policy:
Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning. 19 Placing stability operations on the same footing as combat operations indicates how serious DoD is about developing this capability, since combat is the sine qua non of the armed forces.
This statement possibly represents the most significant shift in the mission of the U.S. military in many years. 
Policy
This section of the Directive describes several actions to be performed as part of the implementation of this policy. Some of these are general statements of intent, while some are more detailed tasks to be performed by elements of DoD. We will examine some of the more important actions that DoD sees as critical to the success of the policy: play "catch-up" when reality finally strikes home. Stability operations must be integrated into all phases of a plan so that it provides an embedded capability that can be employed simultaneous with combat operations.
3. "DoD intelligence efforts shall be designed to provide the optimal mix of capabilities to meet stability operations requirements." 26 Intelligence is a critical component of any military or security operation. This is especially true during stability operations where intelligence drives operations, instead of the other way around. This is because stability operations are not focused on the large scale destruction of enemy forces, but on maintaining security, identifying potential threats to the peace, and supporting the law enforcement aspect of the operation.
While this is a different concept from combat operations, the skills needed to perform intelligence operations within a stability operation are much the same as during combat operations and can be quickly adapted as needed. The difference is that intelligence operators must be trained and prepared to shift their focus from enemy military formations to organized crime, insurgent operations, or former leaders who may be wanted for war crimes. They must also be prepared to assume the lead staff role in advising the commander where to focus his efforts.
4. "Stability operations skills, such as foreign language capabilities, regional area expertise, and experience with foreign governments and International Organizations, shall be developed and incorporated into Professional Military Education at all levels." 27 This is one of the most fundamental changes found in the directive, and one which is critical to the success of the concept. Capabilities begin with training and this paragraph requires all training courses within the military to incorporate the skills necessary to perform successful stability operations. This is in stark contrast with past practice of "just-in-time" training for these operations. We have repeatedly sent forces to conduct stability operations with little or no training for the unique tasks they will need to perform and with little understanding of the region they are about to enter. This is most dramatically displayed in terms of interaction with the indigenous population. Yet, they are still at a distinct disadvantage because, while they are operating from a position of strength, they are dealing with people who know the local environment, people and customs, and know how to manipulate a situation to their own advantage. This section of the directive aims directly at building embedded capability within U.S. forces which will give them a headstart in successful execution of stability operations even without any last minute surge in training.
Responsibilities
The next section of the Directive specifies the responsibilities of various officials in implementing the policy, and there is a significant amount of crucial information found here.
Broad statements of intent are of little effect without the implementing instructions, authorizations and assignment of responsibility necessary to execute the task, and this section is where those are found. While this section of the Directive is quite explicit in terms of responsibilities, there is, however, one significant element lacking in this section, and that is the assignment of an Executive Agent for overall implementation of the policy. In the document
Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD, 28 released by the Defense Science Board Task Force in September 2005, the DSB recommend the Secretary of the Army be designated the Executive Agent for implementation of the policy. However, there is no such designation within this document, which leads to a concern common among military leaders, every operation needs a leader and without one, who will ensure implementation and success, or more succinctly, who is in charge?
There are almost eight pages of specific responsibilities identified in this section of the Directive, and while some of them are broad guidance and standard bureaucrat-ese, there is important information to be found here. In some ways this section indicates a more dramatic shift in policy than the actual policy section of the Directive so we will examine some of the more significant responsibilities assigned within this section. Command are also tasked to provide programs to develop and retain the "quantity and quality of personnel needed for stability operations." 33 This is a crucial aspect of this policy, and one which absolutely must be performed well if the policy is to be successful. There are two reasons for this. First, the defense community must develop the skills necessary to be proficient in this mission. This includes not only the specific unit tasks conducted on the ground, but also the ability to plan and operate effectively with other U.S. agencies, Non-governmental Organizations, International Organizations, allies and others who have expertise in this function.
Second, unless the people in the services, both uniformed and civilian, see this as a valued skill and an accepted pathway to promotion, no one will want to focus on these skills or assignments since it will be seen as a "dead end street." The most dramatic and innovative requirements are listed under the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness which are quoted below: 34 Develop methods to recruit, select, and assign current and former DoD personnel with relevant skills for service in stability operations assignments…
Develop opportunities for DoD personnel to contribute or develop stability operations skills by:
Undertaking tours of duty in other U.S. Departments and Agencies, International Organizations, and NGO's;
Participating in non-DoD education and training programs relevant to stability operations; and Learning languages and studying foreign cultures, including long-term immersion in foreign societies.
While the first of these two tasks indicates a willingness to reach outside the organization to bring in people who really know the stability business, the second task shows that DoD is absolutely serious about developing a robust and well-rounded capability within the military establishment. Assigning military members to work with NGO's is a revolutionary concept, and one which illustrates that DoD sees value in developing connections with the world outside of the U.S. military. This is a significant step forward in taking ownership of a mission that the military has long held at arms length. The final two tasks shown tie in well with ongoing initiatives to improve cultural awareness and increase language ability within the military.
Implementing the Directive
Does this Directive indicate a shift in U.S. policy regarding stability operations? Yes and no. In some ways it is merely admitting to what we have already been doing in Iraq, Afghanistan and many other places and seeks to prevent the lessons learned in those places from becoming lost like so many others. In other ways it is truly a new paradigm for the military.
We are now seeking competency in a mission we have typically avoided and taking steps to institutionalize the capability through changes in training, doctrine, equipment procurement and even personnel assignments so that it becomes part of the military culture. Of course, implementing this new policy could not happen overnight even in the best of times. Institutional resistance, congressional oversight, or even public opinion can quickly develop roadblocks to successful implementation, but we have taken the first step. Clearly, U.S. policy regarding stability operations has undergone significant change under the last two administrations, but where do we go from here? How do we realize the enormous potential inherent in DoD This strategy should also emphasize both the U.S. intent to conduct operations multi-laterally and the willingness to support the efforts of other countries. It should also emphasize how a peace support strategy ties in with the national security strategy of helping to shape a world where economic opportunity is available to anyone and terrorism is rejected by everyone. This will help provide a clear understanding of how the American government intends to operate and provide support to U.N. peace initiatives that may, in turn, impart legitimacy on peace operations undertaken by the U.S.
2. Resource the State Department with money and personnel to enable it to effectively fulfill the requirements of NSPD 44, "to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the United States Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance." Australia, which will serve to broaden the experience base. These assignments correspond to the cultural development imperative in DoD 3000.05 and must be integrated into the assignment management process so that this experience is spread throughout DoD.
4. Continue to expand the integration of stability operations into training exercises at all levels of the military. These exercises should include stability operations both simultaneous and subsequent to combat operations. This will help units and leaders at all levels gain experience with the unique requirements of stability operations. 6. Continue developing stability operations skills, and regional area knowledge throughout the military training experience, including DA Civilian programs. While general principles may be taught early in the educational process, regional specialization will be required to produce the greatest effect. However, since it is impossible to accurately forecast future regional requirements, the specialized language skill requirements that are so essential to effective stability operations must come from a broad range of sources that must be cultivated in advance. Not all of these need be military, and not all military need be active duty. Stability operations have been part of U.S. national strategy for many years, even though we haven't always called them by that name or employed them effectively. We have intervened in many countries to restore civil government, hunt down international outlaws, and protect people from the repressive actions of their own governments. However, the U.S. has yet to develop and internalize stability operations policy which ties together national intentions in a comprehensive package that we can use to guide future actions and prepare those who must conduct those operations. The suggestions provided above would help move the U.S. in that direction, but no one should have any illusions that these steps are easy, or cheap. Time, money, effort, and especially leadership emphasis are required if the U.S. is to create comprehensive policy, build strong multilateral partnerships, and develop a robust and credible stability operations capability. However, it is time and money well spent. Peacekeeping is a bargain compared to the enormous cost in lives and national treasure that are spent with frightening speed when efforts to support peace are ignored and we are drawn into the crucible of war. Endnotes 1. UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and there is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis. 2. There is a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of a regional character, defined as one or a combination of the following: International aggression, or; -Urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence; -Sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence, or threat of violence. 3. There are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. 4. For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations, a ceasefire should be in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force is deployed. 5. For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant. 6. The means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing and mandate appropriate to the mission. 7. The political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable. 8. The operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.
